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ABSTRACT  This paper focuses both on the use of risk management and biometric technologies 
in the contemporary management of the Canada/US border. It argues that these measures 
contribute directly to a politics of exclusion. In particular, the increasing centralization of 
authority for border security and the transformation of the border into a more 
deterritorialized "virtual border," serves to exclude local stakeholders in the borderlands. In 
fact, the very efficacy of the borderlands itself is in question as the politics and experience of 
the border is moved further from the territorial border and thus out of the conventional 
borderlands. The paper considers the ramifications of relying on risk management, 
considering the (in) appropriateness of it as a strategy for the provision of public security, and 
specifically border security, but also reflects on three noted trends directly associated with 
"governing through risk" at the Canada/US border: the quantification of security and risk and 
the subsequent "zero risk" approach; the technologization of security; and finally, the 
centralization of authority.   
 
To contend that borders are sites of exclusion is far from novel. Integral to modernity 
and sovereignty, the porous character of borders has and continues to be concealed 
by the exercise and contemporary (re)articulation of sovereign power. Since the 
events of 9/11, even the most genteel of borders, such as the Canada/US border, have 
witnessed an increased preoccupation with exclusionary practices, virulent 
applications of risk management, and a general embrace of biometric and Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies focused on identity management of 
varying forms. As a result, the border has been further securitized and in some 
regards, even militarized.  
Although strengthened borders and the intensified securitization of migration 
related to these changes in border security are relatively well documented, such 
accounts tend to argue that borders are “thickening.” Specifically in the Canada/US 
case, the notion of a thickened border post-9/11 is nearly prosaic. While not 
altogether rejecting the metaphor of the thickened border, there is something more 
complex afoot. Rather than simply making the border more difficult to cross, the 
invocation of specific technologies—namely biometrics and RFID—which are 
contextualized within a near obsessive application of risk management by the 68    Benjamin J. Muller 
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agencies charged with the responsibility of border security have both had wider 
consequences, and can be placed within a wider context of contemporary 
rearticulations of security, danger, and identity. In particular, these practices have 
fostered a proliferation of borders and bordering practices. The reliance on various 
identity management schemes, such as trusted traveller programs, tends to extend the 
border outwards. Furthermore, these developments occur within a context where 
such bordering practices that are hinged on identity management techniques and risk 
management strategies are pervasive throughout society. Furthermore, the 
experience of borders and border crossings, both because of particular technological 
imperatives and the perceived need to push the assessment of risk further from the 
physical geographical border, is dramatically altered.  
The focus of this paper is both on  the use of risk management and biometric 
technologies in the contemporary management of the Canada/US border, but more 
specifically, the politics of exclusion that results from a reliance on these 
identification and risk assessment schemes. In particular,  the increasing 
centralization of authority for border security and the transformation of the border 
into a more deterritorialized “virtual border,” serves to exclude local stakeholders in 
the borderlands. In fact, the very efficacy of the borderlands itself is in question as 
the politics and experience of the border is moved further from the territorial border 
and thus out of the conventional borderlands.  
This analysis begins from the assertion that contemporary Canada/US border 
security—led by the initiative of the US and generally closely followed by Canadian 
counterparts—is advanced by the Risk Management (RM) model. Drawing on 
contemporary literature, notably Aradau and van Munster’s pivotal argument on 
“governing through risk,”(2007), I contend that more than simply adopting RM as 
the principal strategy for managing border security, officials have come to govern 
through risk at the Canada/US border. The paper considers the ramifications of this 
move, considering the (in)appropriateness of RM as a strategy for the provision of 
public security and specifically border security, but also reflects on three noted 
trends directly associated with governing through risk at the Canada/US border: one, 
the quantification of security and risk and the subsequent “zero risk” approach; 
second, and intimately related to the first trend, the technologization of security; and 
finally, the third trend is the centralization of authority. However, for this analysis, 
the disempowerment and exclusion of robust stakeholders in the borderlands, which 
is the correlating development of this centralization, is what is of specific focus. 
These three trends in contemporary border security raise critical considerations 
regarding a range of issues akin to Brunet-Jailly and Dupeyron’s fundamental two 
elements of security at/in borders and borderlands: “human activities (the agency and 
agent of power of individual ties and forces spanning the border); and second, the 
broader social processes that frame individual action, such as market forces, 
government activities, and regional culture and politics of a borderland” (2007, p. 1).  
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Securitization and Governing through Risk at the Border:  
“All that is Fluid Solidifies” 
 
Since September 11, references to “securitization” have proliferated. In what appears 
to be a never ending move towards the “securitization of everything,” references to 
the insecurity of transportation, borders, financial institutions, a burgeoning “critical 
infrastructure,” and a host of other critical portions of our modern liberal information 
society are made in the news media and popular culture, by politicians and 
bureaucrats. As the potential, necessary, and/or long overdue, “securitization” of 
various sectors is raised, it is a discourse of insecurity and not security that is 
invoked. To claim, for example, that a border is porous is on the one hand to accept 
the general operation and function of a border for time immemorial; as a line 
crossed, regularly by those in borderlands, and far less so by those from distant 
lands, and a signification of some form of authority, in most modern instances, state 
sovereignty. The alternative, however, is to express the permeability of the border as 
not integral to transboundary communities, international commerce and trade, the 
integrity of a borderland’s cultural, political and socio-economic resiliency, but as 
something dangerous, threatening, and potentially risky. Drawing on the critical 
theory tradition, the first point to be gleaned is the absolute necessity of asking the 
“how possible?” question of securitization. In other words, how is it possible that 
particular issues are labelled as security issues, by whom, and in whose interests?  
In the case of border security, a critical question becomes that of out-sourcing of 
surveillance infrastructures, ID card systems, biometrics, and so on, and the extent to 
which the security professionals responsible for providing these systems—or what 
Bigo (2002) and others have termed “managers of unease”—construct the field of 
risk itself (Leander, 2005; Salter, 2008a, 2008b). In other words, once opened up, 
security professionals have the ability to not only provide “security solutions,” but 
also frame the necessity of certain solutions in such a way as to characterize and 
even define the risk itself. The reliance on forms of biometric identification, CCTV 
surveillance, and various ID card and trusted traveller schemes, in presenting 
themselves as solutions or mitigation strategies make powerful assumptions about 
risk: what/who the potential risks might be, and how these threats are likely to 
operate/behave. 
This brief comment picks up on a particular notion of “securitization” that has 
emerged among scholars in the field of critical security studies. The breadth of 
securitization approaches is too grand to fully engage here; however, it is worth 
noting that in many cases, and indeed in this article, references to securitization 
connote far more than what the early theorists of this approach referred to as “speech 
acts” (Waever, 1995). That is to say, when considering the securitization of the 
Canada/US border, for example, the analysis that follows is reflecting on deeper 
questions of constructing the issue and discourse of security, taking note of the actors 
involved, and the broader social processes that frame and are affected by this move, 
as opposed to simply noting how a particular issue area comes to be referred to as a 
security issue. This particular understanding of securitization, referred to by some as 
the Paris School (see CASE Collective 2006), fits well with the notion of “governing 
through risk.” 
In their article on “Governing terrorism through risk: Taking precautions, 
(un)knowing the future,” Aradau and van Munster (2007) develop a notion of 70    Benjamin J. Muller 
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“precautionary risk.” Drawing from the work of Ulrich Beck and others, the notion 
that certain risks (such as “manufactured risks”) do not come from outside, as 
external risks do, but are “manufactured by the very impact of our  developing 
knowledge about the world” (Ceyhan, 2008, p. 105). Unlike simple external risks, 
manufactured risks, such as environmental, health, nuclear, etc., are not tied to our 
ability to calculate them, since we cannot and do not know the real level of risk (p. 
105). As François Ewald (1991) notes, nothing is a risk in and of itself, but rather, it 
depends on how the evaluation of danger and the context and circumstances is made. 
Similarly, Beck (2006) and others refer to such risks as incalculable risks; risks that 
are uncertain or even considered to be “intentional catastrophes,” like terrorism. 
Aradau and van Munster’s notion of “precautionary risk” is precisely at this 
limitation of risk thinking, and thus represents an attempt at prevention, taming the 
limit, monitoring, managing, and governing the ungovernable and the uncertain 
(2007, p. 107). Still others have connected this to a preemptory logic that is 
embedded in such attempts to “manage uncertainty” and “govern the ungovernable” 
(De Goede, 2008a, 2008b), which is precisely how the task of contemporary border 
security has been framed: mobility itself becomes potentially threatening (Packer, 
2006) as the porosity of borders is assumed away in a reversal of the Marxian 
dictum, “all that is solid melts into air” and all that is fluid and porous solidifies.  
To simply note that “governing through risk” is an influential force behind the 
institutions charged with securing the border tells us very little. The prevalence of 
RM strategies in contemporary border security is ubiquitous. Just months after 9/11, 
the signing of the “Smart Border Declaration” in December 2001, and the subsequent 
Smart Border Accord, which is responsible for inspiring many of the current border 
security strategies such as NEXUS—the much touted trusted traveller program—and 
the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) expressed a strong commitment to 
RM. Similarly, “Secure Flight” and “Passenger Protect,” the respective American 
and Canadian “no fly list” programs are heavily motivated by the logic of RM. 
Indeed, even the thinking behind the more substantial trilateral Security and 
Prosperity Partnership (SPP) between Mexico, Canada, and the US, is clearly not 
untouched from the logic of RM. Moving towards specifics, the Canadian 
government is itself not altogether satisfied with the performance of the relatively 
newly created Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), citing that it “lacks an 
integrated risk management framework” (Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 
2008). Although the statement suggests the CBSA has not successfully integrated a 
risk management framework, it underscores the commitment to “governing through 
risk” by their political masters.  
The account forwarded here does not engage in the specific actuarial calculations 
and technicalities of RM in contemporary border security, nor is there an attempt in 
this analysis to provide a scale or continuum upon which one can judge more or less 
effective applications of RM on the basis of its own logic. In contrast, the general 
logic of governance that accompanies the employment of RM in a more general 
sense is of interest, as is the extent to which its efficacy can or cannot actually be 
measured. Rather than critique RM as a strategy in general, the focus here is to 
critically question its application in Canada/US border security. RM may indeed be 
sound as an approach to governance for a whole range of reasons, however, in 
dealing with so-called “incalculable risks” or uncertainties, or what Aradau and van Borders, Risks, Exclusions   71 
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Munster label “taming the limit,” its strategy, method, and utility are in question. If, 
as Beck contends, “risk is ambivalence,” one would never know it from the 
ubiquitous calculations, measurements, and numbers, that are literally 
haemorrhaging from contemporary security professionals to rationalize their tactics, 
justify their costs, and valorize their efforts.  
 
 
The “Risk” of Quantification 
 
The alleged necessity of enhancing border security verges on prosaic in the post-9/11 
context. Although a number of issues were flagged by, among others, The 9/11 
Commission Report, border security seemed to progress to the head of the class 
overnight. Bolstered by catastrophic thinking often forwarded in popular accounts 
such as Stephen Flynn’s America the Vulnerable, the securitization of the 
Canada/US border was quickly underway. Specifically, as part of the institutional 
restructuring under the newly formulated Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
the institutional management of the border followed suit, and Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) was created. As with many other post-9/11 developments 
particularly (and for some obvious reasons in the case of border security, being that 
the border itself is shared), Canada followed the US lead, creating the CBSA. In both 
cases, the management of the border shifted from one focused on customs collections 
to an obsessive preoccupation with security.  
Charged with securing the border, these new institutions quickly found themselves 
at odds with massive amounts of commercial, leisure and tourist traffic that crosses 
the Canada/US border on a daily basis. The Department of Transportation regularly 
finds itself in a difficult position, a department of the government and thus interested 
in state security by definition, and yet it is charged with enhancing the flow of goods, 
services, people, etc. even across borders and through airports. These contrasting 
ambitions are yet unresolved. The extent to which border agencies need likewise be 
concerned with more than simply securing the border is abundantly apparent on a 
daily basis across the length of the Canada/US border. How then can the security of 
the border be enhanced while maintaining the imperatives of relatively efficient and 
timely border crossing for goods and services? “Properly executed” RM techniques 
are believed to be the answer to this dilemma.
1
Since its origins are in the insurance industry, RM continues to be commonplace 
throughout that arena. Risks such as potential flooding, fires, and vandalism, to name 
a few, are quantified and measured in terms of low to high risk, primarily on the 
basis of the assessed potential frequency and impact of such risks. There are statistics 
on fires, it is clear that certain materials are more flammable than others, low lying 
areas are more prone to flooding, etc. When applied to so-called “acts of God” 
natural disasters, or in the case of this analysis, potential terrorism, there is clearly a 
deep problem associated with quantifying the risk. As Salter (2008b) has eloquently 
put it, we are in the space of “imaginary numbers” at this point. The importance of 
“imagination” cannot be over-emphasized, as preparation for the risks that fall into 
the category of the ungovernable or uncertain have little if any data upon which the 
quantification can be based, and thus are premised to a much greater degree on what 
 Unfortunately, the nature of RM 
presents some problems when applied to border security, both in terms of the 
underlying logic and its method.  72    Benjamin J. Muller 
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is often referred to as “catastrophic thinking.” The Pacific Northwest Economic 
Region (PNWER), for example, conducts a program called “Blue Cascades,” in 
which a potential catastrophe is imagined, and scenarios and simulations are worked 
out as a mode of preparation. Once imagined, one then must engage in a risk 
assessment, wherein the frequency and impact of the risk is measured. 
 
 
Table 1: Security Screening 
 
Positive: presence of prohibited item, 
detection, “stop” decision 
False Positive: presence of prohibited 
item, no detection, “go decision” 
Negative: no presence of prohibited 
item, no detection, “go” decision 
False Negative: no presence of 
prohibited item, detection, “stop” 
decision 
(Salter 2008b: 256). 
 
 
The potential problems associated with the use of RM in border security can be 
divided into two categories: the first is associated with the use of RM itself in terms 
of its strategies and assessment techniques; the second is linked to creating resiliency 
through redundancy, and what is termed here as “The redundancy problematic” 
(Muller forthcoming). The analysis begins with a brief overview of RM, considering 
briefly its emergence as a central logic in contemporary border security. As a part of 
new public management techniques, RM has emerged as a ubiquitous strategy across 
much of the contemporary public and private sectors. As a method for rationalizing 
increased resource allocation to particular sectors under conditions of increased 
demands on government and resource scarcity is where much of the attraction lay for 
RM strategies. A significant problem with this is the reliance on quantification in 
RM, and the extent to which success and/or failure is quantified. In the case of 
border security, as Table 1 from Salter’s (2008b) analysis of RM and quantification 
indicates, measuring false positives is difficult if not impossible unless these errors 
result in a catastrophic failure, such as Richard Reid (“The Shoe Bomber”), or the 
death of Robert Dziekanski at Vancouver airport (discussed later), which causes 
subsequent institutional changes and adaptations to the risk assessment. In other 
words, one has no way of knowing how many people are crossing the border with 
contraband, weapons, etc., unless they are used in such a way that it results in some 
sort of catastrophe. Similarly, no records are kept of how many false negatives occur, 
which in security terms may be of little relevance, yet in terms of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of border security are of great import.  
In the case of the Canada/US border in the Cascade Gateway—a relatively 
populated corridor between Seattle, Washington and Vancouver, British Columbia—
for example, vehicles and passengers are regularly subject to more in-depth checks 
by both Canadian and American officials, often to no end. The argument can be 
made that such random interrogation acts as a deterrence, but the counter-argument 
that this is simply inconveniencing honest travellers who are without contraband and 
who do not pose any serious security threat is equally valid, as neither argument can 
be proven with any certainty or statistical measure. Providing meaningless Borders, Risks, Exclusions   73 
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measurements of such matters, or simply failing to compile such statistics, is 
precisely what Salter refers to as “imaginary numbers.” In order to underscore the 
problem with RM in terms of its reliance on quantification for rationalizing increased 
resource allocation and specifically measuring success or failure of the security 
approaches used, and the general exclusionary principles behind these strategies, the 
anecdote of Robert Dziekanski in Vancouver International Airport in October 2007 
is particularly instructive. Not only does the Dziekanski case expose the extent to 
which measurement of the success or failure of RM is somewhat reliant on 
catastrophic failure, but it also exposes the emerging harsh, and exclusionary 
practices of border security.  
On October 13, 2007, a flight arrived at Vancouver International Airport (YVR) at 
approximately 3:15pm. A middle-aged construction worker from Poland, Robert 
Dziekanski, was aboard this flight, with the intent of immigrating to Canada from 
Poland to live with his mother in Kamloops, British Columbia. Upon completing 
initial customs clearance, Mr. Dziekanski was referred to secondary immigration 
processing. It was already clear that Mr. Dziekanski was unable to speak English, as 
he required assistance in the initial processing. It was also obvious that he was under 
some duress, noted by airport staff, as he was pale and sweating. Between 4:00pm 
and 10:45pm, Mr. Dziekanski’s precise whereabouts are unclear. However, he was in 
a secure area of the airport, which he could not leave without proper documentation, 
and interviews done after the fact indicate that he was milling around the luggage 
carousels during this period. It should be noted that this is a secure area of the 
airport. During this period, Mr. Dziekanski’s mother, who was waiting in the public 
arrivals area of the airport, asked about the whereabouts of her son, but without 
appropriate flight information, she received little information and was told he had not 
arrived. Assuming he missed the flight, Dziekanski’s mother left for Kamloops.  
At approximately 10:45pm, Mr. Dziekanski attempted to leave the secure customs 
hall area, and was again referred to secondary immigration for processing. After 
finding some missing bags that contained necessary immigration information and 
finally completing secondary processing, Mr. Dziekanski was free to go at 12:15am. 
After sitting for another 30 minutes in the customs hall, Mr. Dziekanski was asked 
by airport officials to leave the secure area and move to the international arrivals 
reception area at YVR. Mr. Dziekanski became increasingly agitated, propped the 
doors between the secure customs hall and the arrivals reception area open with a 
chair, and threw a small table and computer to the ground. The Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) were called by airport officials at this point, and upon 
arriving asked an agitated Mr. Dziekanski to move up against a wall in the secure 
customs hall area where Mr. Dziekanski was waiting.  
Approximately 25 to 30 seconds after arrival, the RCMP officers decided to 
deploy the use of the Taser, an electroshock weapon,2  and after tackling Mr. 
Dziekanski to the ground officers chose to Taser Mr. Dziekanski once more. As a 
result of the Taser, Mr. Dziekanski tragically died at the scene. There is a reasonable 
amount of precision regarding the timeline and facts of this incident, in part because 
the event has been the subject of a public inquiry into the use of Tasers by law 
enforcement, and in part because a member of the public captured the final moments 
of Mr. Dziekanski’s life, including the Tasering by RCMP, on video which was 
subsequently shown on the internet and the national and international news media.  74    Benjamin J. Muller 
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Aside from the obvious tragic death of Mr. Dziekanski, and some serious 
questions regarding the use of Tasers by law enforcement officers, there are a series 
of critically important issues regarding the use of RM in border security that expose 
emerging exclusionary and exceptional practices at ports of entry. Not least of 
which, complications associated with the management of virtual borders in the 
modern airport and to what extent highly exclusionary practices in border security 
are fostered over inclusionary ones, or at the very least, whether approaches to 
border security are sensitive to the diverse bodies crossing borders, and acknowledge 
the porous nature of those borders.  
As a point of entry, the airport is by definition a virtual (and biometric) border 
(Muller, 2008b). While this particular incident ended in tragedy, there is no real way 
of knowing how often people are able to loiter unaccounted for in the secure customs 
hall in the airport, since such figures are not kept and would indeed be incredibly 
difficult to obtain. This situation also underscores some of the problems associated 
with the strategy RM provides, when applied to areas of public security, or in this 
case, specifically border security. While RM provides four options when faced with 
risk—accept, mitigate, avoid, transfer—the reality is that one, and at best two of 
these strategies are not only the sole desirable options when confronted with risks in 
public security, but they are indeed the only possible options. The incident involving 
Mr. Dziekanski not only highlights the extent to which the complexity of 
overlapping and unclear lines of authority at the virtual border makes the transfer of 
risk possible—that is, let’s say from the CBSA in this instance to the RCMP—but 
also that accepting the risk and possibly mitigating it, are in fact the only genuine 
options. Avoiding it is simply not rational for the provision of public security, and 
even transferring the risk only contributes to institutional and inter-departmental 
power struggles, uncertainties, and incongruities, thus not providing increased public 
security. As this specific case indicates, those lines of authority and authorization are 
unclear. Furthermore, not only does the catastrophic failure of the Dziekanski case 
indicate a reliance on such cases for measuring the success or failure of RM, but it is 
also indicative of emerging logics of exception and exclusion as the “default” 
response in the contemporary management of borders.  
Although the management of the border has changed vis-à-vis institutional 
transformation from one of simply customs, excise, and to a lesser extent, an 
immigration and visa regime, towards a far greater emphasis on security (including, 
even, arming the CBSA at great cost to the Canadian taxpayer), the efficacy of this 
decision is unclear in light of this particular case. When confronted with what was 
assessed at the time as a security risk, or one might even say a security breach, the 
new and reinvigorated CBSA designed to manage and most importantly secure “the 
border” was shown to be rather impotent, and relied on traditional institutional 
arrangements to deal with the situation, and a general embrace of exclusionary 
methods associated with conventional sovereign power.3 Thus, the mismanagement 
and subsequent tragic death of Robert Dziekanski highlights not only the general 
impossibility of quantifying certain failures with border security—and subsequently 
indicates that claims of success are speculative—but also raises serious doubts about 
the efficacy of the RM approach itself when applied in the realm of public security, 
and specifically, border security. The close relationship and even correlative Borders, Risks, Exclusions   75 
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association between the reliance on RM and the subsequent technologization of 
contemporary border security is also worth noting.  
 
 
Technologization: The Emerging Biometric Border 
 
As RM emerges as the dominant model of security, the thirst for quantification that 
accompanies it contributes directly to the technologization of border security. Put 
simply, technology has itself become the centerpiece of contemporary security 
systems (Ceyhan, 2008). As Salter (2006) notes, by imposing biometric passports on 
foreigners who seek entry into the United States, the US administration contributed 
directly to the transformation of biometrics into a global security norm (also see 
Ceyhan, 2008). Both institutional changes to the border agencies in Canada and the 
US, as well as the increasing reliance on surveillance and technological means of 
prescreening—which is presented as an effective means for pre-assessing risk—have 
dramatically changed how the border functions and is experienced by those crossing 
it, and have likewise dramatically altered the landscape of influential stakeholders 
involved in the management of the border. The material design of the border itself is 
significant, insofar as it contributes to freer movement for those voluntarily enrolled 
in trusted or registered traveller schemes, such as NEXUS or the Enhanced Driver’s 
Licence.4  Together with the institutional transition from customs enforcement 
towards a security function, the border moves away from a visa/passport/ 
immigration regime towards a surveillance regime that is less tied to geography and 
more caught up in a politics of exclusion. Although these changes are considered to a 
far greater extent elsewhere,5
The transformation and/or securitization of the Canada/US border, in this case 
specifically in the Cascade Gateway, owe much to the increasing reliance on 
technology. The increasing use of surveillance techniques, biometric identification 
vis-à-vis both the US VISIT system and NEXUS, as well as the relatively less secure 
and more controversial RFID technology in the enhanced BC/Washington State 
driver’s licence pilot program (which is also present in NEXUS), has altered how the 
border functions, as well as how it is experienced by those crossing.
  some brief commentary is needed here, as it is a 
crucial part of the puzzle in terms of the transformation of the Canada/US Border, 
materially, institutionally, and “bodily.”  
6 In much the 
same way as “no fly lists” function, NEXUS (and the commercial equivalent, FAST) 
and other such programs extend the border outwards, (i.e., cause a proliferation of 
borders, as opposed to a thickening of the sovereign border), enabling a pre-
assessment of risk far before one physically crosses the border. In the case of virtual 
borders in airports, pre-assessment is far easier, due to the necessary reliance on 
travel agencies or online ticket booking services, and commercial airlines. In sharp 
contrast, aside from registered traveller programs, there is currently no method to 
pre-assess risk at the land border, as those wishing to cross it are by in large relying 
on personal modes of transportation, and thus not entering any existing 
transportation networks which might facilitate screening, other than bus or train 
travel. Unfortunately, as the experience with the commercial registered traveller 
program, FAST, has shown, due in large part to the desire to securitize the entire 
supply chain, registration and pre-assessing risk can force almost crippling 
administrative burdens on the users, making such measures relatively ineffective, 76    Benjamin J. Muller 
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due to the complexity of the pre-assessment, and the ensuing cost and inconvenience. 
On the subject of cost, there is little if any public consultation regarding the use of 
certain technologies. Aside from such privacy concerns and the like, the monetary 
costs deserve debate. The lack of discussion over such matters raises serious concern 
over what Didier Bigo and others have referred to as “managers of unease” (Bigo, 
2002; Leander, 2005). 
As with the use of private contractors in Iraq, or the decision to use particular ID 
card schemes in various national contexts (Bennett & Lyon, 2008), the relationship 
between the providers of the technology and related commercial interests and the 
decision makers themselves is often far too close for comfort, which raises serious 
concerns about what or whose “security” these schemes actually serve. As Leander 
has effectively noted in the case of private security contractors, these actors gain the 
capacity to construct specific articulations of security and insecurity to their own 
advantage. In the case of border security, similar issues of concern arise when 
security technology providers gain prominence. Certainly the lack of information 
surrounding specifics about the pilot program for a joint BC–Washington enhanced 
driver’s licence does not leave even the most casually curious observer void of 
suspicion.7
 
  Together, these issues further underscore the extent to which the 
capacity, control, and effective authority/authorization over the contemporary 
management of the Canada/US border by the borderlands has been continuously 
eroded and driven towards a politics of exclusion.  
  
Liberty, Security, and the Disempowerment/Exclusion of the Borderlands 
 
The primary focus of the analysis presented here is on the employment of RM in the 
contemporary securitization of the Canada/US border, and the subsequent 
technologization of security that follows. However, one ought not underestimate the 
rich borderlands and the actors that comprise it in this specific context. The 
International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project (IMTC) hosted by the Whatcom 
Council of Governments (WCOG), or the work of the Pacific Northwest Economic 
Region (PNWER), not to mention the close collaboration and support the Border 
Policy Research Institute at Western Washington University receives from and 
provides to these coalitions of actors, underscores the effectiveness, capacity, and 
increasing frustration of these key stakeholders in the borderlands. Victim of a rather 
narrow set of political objectives, contemporary US homeland security, and border 
security specifically, has succumbed to the securitizing and centralizing post-9/11 
trends that have effectively not only excluded those defined as “risky,” but also those 
in the borderlands.  
The interests of cultural, political and market factors with long standing histories 
of cross border collaboration and cooperation in borderlands have been neglected, 
ignored, or in the most nefarious reading of the situation, intentionally disempowered 
and excluded. The reliance on RM strategies in border security, which leads almost 
inevitably to a “zero risk” approach to border security, when combined with 
centralized political authority and a securitization of identity vis-à-vis biometric 
technologies leaves both the local and the global out of the picture. While the 
ramifications of such an approach are widespread, it acts most acutely to the Borders, Risks, Exclusions   77 
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detriment of the long-standing trans-border cultural, political, and market relations 
that make the borderland so robust, and able to foster a politics of inclusion rather 
than exclusion.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1  The paradoxical relationship between security and the imperatives of mobility is most 
obvious in the case of the virtual border(s) at the airport. Although airport security has been 
dramatically heightened in the post-9/11 environment, and as a point of entry it acts as a 
“virtual border,” with regards to passenger prescreening in airports, one of the primary 
measures of success for both the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the 
Canadian Transport Security Authority (CATSA) is how quickly passengers are processed 
through security checks.  
2  The use of the Taser is premised on the argument that it is considered to be a non-lethal form 
of restraint that is to be used by special trained police officers in place of lethal force. The 
Taser is an electroshock weapon that is intended to incapacitate the neuromuscular system 
through involuntary contractions and stimulations. Tasers use approximately 50,000 to 
100,000 volts to incapacitate the victim. While marketed as non-lethal, the number of lethal 
incidents and proliferation of inquiries into its use and moratoriums suggest its lethality 
remains open to debate.  
3   Not only was the creation of the CBSA scrutinized, but the decision to arm CBSA staff was 
highly contentious, both in terms of objections rooted in Canadian political culture and 
identity and the perspective on firearms, but arguably more importantly from the RCMP 
itself, which is most clearly evident in the Canadian Customs and Excise Union (CEUDA) 
Submission to the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence discussion of Bill 
C-26: An Act to Establish the Canadian Border Services Agency. 
4  It should be noted that the Enhanced Driver’s Licence (EDL) is not a trusted traveller 
program, but simply a registered system. For example, being convicted of a felony will not 
in and of itself prevent one from obtaining an EDL. 
5   See Muller 2008b; Epstein 2007; Amoore 2006. 
6  On problems with the enhanced driver’s licence scheme and the reliance on RFID 
technology, see Testimony of Sophia Cope, Staff Attorney/Ron Plesser Fellow, Center for 
Democracy and Technology, Before Senate Committee On Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, on  The Impact of Implementation: A 
Review of the REAL ID Act and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Tuesday April 
29, 2008. 
7  The pilot program for the joint BC-Washington enhanced driver’s licence is one among a 
few similar programs across Canada/US borderlands. Increased background checks and so-
called “breeder documentation” (birth certificate, proof of residency, etc.) is required in 
order to apply for this program. However, criminal background checks are not a 
requirement, and as this program is not a “trusted traveller” card as such—like NEXUS—
one  could be guilty of a felony and hold an enhanced DL. Furthermore, there has been 
relatively strong government support and enrolment in the program in Washington state, 
whereas the British Columbia trial is capped at 500.  
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